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SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd.:
Registration of Foreign Patents
in the United States
No case in the last decade has provoked more violent argument
among specialists in trademark law 1 than SCM Corporation v. Langis
Foods, Ltd. (Lemon Tree). 2 The recent opinion of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals supplements the confusing flurry of notes, com-
ments and articles that have followed the case since its inception and
allows its impact to be fully evaluated for the first time. It is now
evident that when Circuit Judge McGowan refused to consider the
holding of the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board as an issue before
the judiciary, but instead ruled upon a much narrower legal question, a
peculiar twist occurred: the administrative decision of the Board was
allowed to stand, despite its unsoundness; simultaneously, a wise
judicial decision of importance was handed down by the appellate
court. Lemon Tree therefore assumes a Janus importance. The case is
important for the issue it raised and administratively resolved as a case
before the trademark tribunal and it is important for the different
question of law judicially determined before the court of appeals. The
government agency and district court did not consider the same legal
question as did the court of appeals. This fact is central to an
understanding of the instant case, and cannot be overemphasized.
Shakespeare hinted at the function of a trademark when he wrote
in Othello, "He who steals my purse, steals trash, but he who steals my
good name, steals all." 3 A trademark not only identifies the source of a
product,4 but it is also a symbol of the goodwill of the business in
which it is used. 5
1 See, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REV. 308; Offner, Can An Orange Tree", a Lime
Tree", and a Lemon Tree®, Produce a TRT Tree? 72 PAT. T.M. Rev. 99 (1974).
2 SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 539 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). SCM is successor
in interest to John Lecroy & Son, Inc., which was the actual plaintiff before the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board of the United States Patent Office, and sub-
sequently appeared in the District Court. SCM is therefore also successor in interest to
first user of the Lemon Tree trademark in the United States. See John Lecroy & Son,
Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 308 (T.T.A.B. 1973),
vacated, 376 F. Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132, 65 TRADE-MARK REP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom, SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 539 F.2d 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
The case shall be referred to hereafter as Lemon Tree, after the requested trademark.
'Lemon Tree' was the proposed name of a fruit drink.
3 SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO at Act III, scene iii, lines 157-61.
4 See, e.g., Clairol Inc. v. Gillette Co., 270 F. Supp. 371, aff'd 389 F.2d 264
(D.C.N.Y. 1967).
5 See, e.g., E. Leitz, Inc. v. Watson, 152 F. Supp. 631, aff'd 254 F.2d 777, 103 U.S.
App.D.C. 74 (1957).
180 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
Every nation realizes the great value of such marks and the need to
protect them and other industrial property. However, their recognition
under the law varies considerably. The Anglo-Saxon common law
concept of protection of trademarks is predicated upon the use of the
mark in trade: "the date of the first sale of the goods bearing the
trademark becomes the date of the first use of the mark." 6 The
European civil code approach however, allows a right of protection to
arise out of mere registration prior to any use of the mark. 7
As long as trade remained local or regional this dichotomy of
jurisprudence was of little consequence, but growth in world trade
meant trademarks and patents needed protection in international
markets. This need was first expressed in the International Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property [Paris Union Treaty or P.U.T.]. 8
The P.U.T. required each participating nation to provide effective protec-
tion of trade names. Recognizing that a dichotomy of law existed, the
Convention also tried to lessen the friction between the use require-
ment of the common law and the mere registration requirement of the
civil law by adopting the basic premise that each country had to give
foreign signatories the same rights and advantages bestowed upon its
own citizens. These rights were to be extended without prejudice to
the rights specially provided in the treaty itself. 9
Both the common law system of trademark rights and the provi-
sions of the Paris Union Treaty were implemented in this country by
the Trademark Act (Lanham Act) of 1946.10 Section 1 provides that
after common law rights in a trademark have been created by use in
trade, a person can register the mark. To obtain a valid registration
under the Lanham Act, two different uses must be established: the
"use" which ties the mark to the product, thus creating common law
rights, and "the use 'in interstate commerce,' which makes the
trademark eligible for federal registration." 1
Foreign nationals have always been able to register marks in the
United States by complying with these requirements. The foreign
merchant can follow an alternative course for filing an application in
6 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 308, 309.
7 Browne, International Trademark Protection, 15 IDEA: PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J.
RESEARCH EDUC. 1 at 90 (1971).
8 [1969] 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. More than seventy nations, including the
United States, participated in the agreement. The Paris Union Treaty has seen two
revisions since the last world war: Lisbon (1958), Stockholm (1967).
9 Id. at 226. Article 2 of the Paris Union Treaty reads:
(1) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the
advantages that their respective laws now grant.., without prejudice to the rights
specially provided by the present Convention.
10 Lanham Trademark Act, §§ 1, 2(d), 44(b), 44(d); 15 U.S.C. 1051, 1052(d),
1126(b), 1126(d) (1970).
11 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 308, 310.
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this country. Article 412 of the Paris Treaty states that a signatory is
entitled to a right of priority - a filing date equal to his filing in his home
country - if he files an application in any other country participating
in the Treaty within six months from the date on which the application
was first filed in his home country. Consequently, intervening acts -
in particular, a filing or use of the trademark by another party -
cannot invalidate the international registration. 1
3
Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act is a statutory restatement of
Article 4. It grants a right of priority to the foreigner who has already
filed an application for registration of the same trademark in one of the
participating countries to the P.U.T., provided the application is filed
within six months of the date on which the application was filed in the
foreign country and the United States application meets the require-
ments of the Trademark Act, although "use in commerce need not be
alleged." 14
The Commissioner of Patents (United States Patent Office) has
therefore been faced with implementing policy through an Act which
demands adherence to the common law requirement of use (§ 1) and
simultaneously exempts foreigners from that same requirement (§
12 [1969] 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931 at 227-29. The relevant sections of Article 4
read as follows:
A. (1) A person who has duly filed an application.., for the registration of
a... trademark, in one of the countries of the Union, or his successors in title,
shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority
during the periods hereinafter stated.
(2) Every filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing under the
domestic law of any country of the Union... shall be recognized as giving rise
to the right of priority.
B. Consequently, the subsequent filing in any other of the countries of the Union
before the expiration of those periods shall not be invalidated through an act
accomplished in the interval, as, for instance, by another filing . . . or by use of
the mark .... These acts cannot give rise to any rights of third parties.
C. (1) The... period of priority shall be... six months for trademarks.
D. (1) Any person desiring to take advantage of the priority of a previous filing
shall be required to make a declaration indicating the date of such filing and
the country in which it was made.
13 Id. at 227.
14 Lanham Act § 44(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1970). This section provides in part:
(d) An application for registration of a mark under sections 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, or
1091 of this title, filed by a person described in subsection (b) of this section who has
previously filed an application for registration of the same mark in one of the
countries described in subsection (b) of this section shall be accorded the same force
and effect as would be accorded to the same application if filed in the United States
on the same day the application was first filed in such foreign country: Provided
that-
(1) the application in the United States is filed within six months from the date on
which the application was first filed in the foreign country;
(2) the application conforms as nearly as practicable to the requirements of this
chapter, but use in commerce need not be alleged;
(3) the rights acquired by third parties before the date of the filing of the first
application in the foreign country shall in no way be affected by a registration
obtained on an application filed under this subsection.
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44(d)). The result has been thirty years of conflicting aaministrative
decisions vacillating between requiring foreign applicants to allege use
somewhere (most commonly in the country of origin), or use
nowhere. 1 5 Policy since 1963 had been to require use somewhere, but
at the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board on May 7, 1973, the
Commissioner, in deciding Lemon Tree, declared that a foreigner need
not allege any use whatsoever under § 44 of the Trademark Act.
Langis filed applications in Canada on March 28, 1969 to register
three trademarks which had never been used anywhere - Apple Tree,
Orange Tree, and Lemon Tree. The corporation then filed three similar
trademark applications with the United States Patent Office. Langis
asked for registration of the marks based upon the six months right of
priority (under § 44(d)) and alleged its date of first use in Canada as
May 15, 1969. The Patent Office then issued Langis a valid registration
for the Lemon Tree mark. An American company, SCM Corporation,
petitioned to have the Lemon Tree registration cancelled, and the
Orange Tree and Apple Tree applications denied. Evidently, SCM had
been using the trademarks in the United States after Langis had filed its
Canadian application, but before Langis had filed its application in the
United States.
On May 7, 1973, the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board denied
SCM's petitions on the ground that, "pursuant to § 44(d) of the
Trademark Act of 1946, '[Langis] is entitled herein as a matter of right
to rely upon the filing dates of its Canadian applications, i.e., March
28, 1969, and hence.., it possesses superior rights in its marks as
against [SCM].' ",16
Although Langis had alleged use of the trademark in its applica-
tion, the Patent Office transcript records that the agency erroneously
believed that the Canadian corporation "made no use of the marks
Apple Tree, Orange Tree, or Lemon Tree prior to the filing of its
applications to register the same."' 17 This substantial mistake led the
Board to believe that the issue which confronted it was whether a
foreign applicant could be required to allege use when applying for a
registration under § 44(d). After thoroughly evaluating the Lanham
Act, the Patent Office concluded that:
15 Attempts to reconcile the use and no-use doctrines first found expression in
British Callender's Cables Ltd., 83 U.S.P.Q. 319, 39 TRADE-MARK REP. 1057 (Comm'r
1949). The Commissioner held in this 1949 case that use must be alleged somewhere.
Seven years later, this was expressly overruled in Societe Fromageries Bel (so-called
Merry Cow case), when it was held that provisions of the P.U.T. coupled with §44(d)
required the U.S. to eliminate the use requirement for foreign applicants, 105
U.S.P.Q. 392, 45 TRADE-MARK REP. 846 (Comm'r 1955). Merry Cow was subsequently
reversed in 1963 in In re Certain Incomplete Trademark Applications, 137 U.S.P.Q. 69,
53 TRADE-MARK REP. 577 (Comm'r 1963), which again embraced the "use-somewhere"
doctrine. The pendulum swung again in 1973 with the Lemon Tree decision.
16 177 U.S.P.Q. at 718, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. at 309 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
17 Id. at 717.
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... there is nothing in the Trademark Act authorizing the Patent
Office to require a foreign applicant under § 44(d) use of his mark
prior to filing his application in his home country; requirement of
such use would do violence to the intent of Industrial Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property. (P.U.T.). 1'
The Board thus reversed the administrative policy followed for the
previous ten years, and reinstated the use nowhere requirement.
When SCM appealed to the district court, commentators
everywhere were hopeful that the judiciary would "confront this
administrative confusion squarely and settle the matter." 19 The court,
however, confused the issue even more. In overturning the Board's
ruling, the district court rejected both the "use nowhere" and the "use
somewhere" alternatives and asserted that the Trademark Act actually
required much more than use somewhere; it required use in the United
States. 20 The district court reversed the administrative decision and
awarded registration to SCM because that company alone had alleged
use in the United States.
The case was in total disarray when it reached the court of appeals.
That court however, interpreted the facts correctly. Being the first
tribunal to understand that Langis had alleged use somewhere, Judge
McGowan realized that the use-no use question was not before the
court at all. Since the Canadian firm had alleged use somewhere, it had
met the maximum administrative requirement ever imposed. 21 Indeed,
the only legal issue before the court was the precise question upon
which the Patent Office should have ruled: Is § 2(d) of the Lanham Act,
which "prohibits registration of a trademark previously used in the
United States by another [i.e., SCM]," 22 overridden by § 44(d), which
gave Langis a six month right of priority following the filing of its
application in Canada and also provided that an intervening use by
another party during this period could not invalidate the right to
registration?
The court held that § 2(d) was so overridden. After reading sections
44(b) and 44(d) as capable of reconciliation with § 2(d), the court
concluded that since § 44(d) was a legislative restatement of Article 4 of
the Paris Union Treaty, "a foreign applicant's mark must be protec-
ted... even as against intervening first use by another in the United
States."23
18 Id. at 718.
19 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 308.
2 0 376 F. Supp. at 968, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 138, 65 TRADE-MARK REP. at 307 (D.C. 1974).
The District Court granted summary judgment after a strict reading of §1. "Prior right
in a trademark in the United States," said the court, "depends upon priority of use in
the United States, and is not affected by priority of use in a foreign country."
21 In re Certain Incomplete Trademark Applications, 137 U.S.P.Q. 69, 53 TRADE-
MARK REP. 577 (Comm'r 1963).
22 539 F.2d at 202; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970).
23 Id. at 201.
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Section 2(d) was therefore not read in isolation. The court of
appeals recognized that the legislative history and intent of Congress
was to allow registration based on something other than "use in
commerce," namely, a foreign registration. Section 2(d) was inter-
preted to apply only in those situations where a domestic used the
trademark before the foreign merchant filed application in its home
country and hence was inapplicable to the situation in Lemon Tree.24
It is also of substantial importance that the court declared that the
use-no use requirement was not an issue before the judiciary; the
opinion of the district court was therefore vacated. In effect, the court
of appeals allowed the decision of the trademark tribunal to stand
independently of its own ruling.
Lemon Tree now stands for the proposition that there is nothing in
the 1946 Trademark Act to require foreign applicants under § 44(d) to
use their mark anywhere prior to the filing of their application in their
home country. 25 This complete reversal of United States trademark
policy towards foreign nationals means that
(1) United States trademark registration and trademark rights can
now be acquired by foreigners without trade or use;
(2) A foreigner's right to trademark in the United States now exists
independently of the business and goodwill in connection with
the mark used, because use is no longer required. 26
In essence, foreigners have been exempted from the common law of
trademarks. Henceforth, the old concept that a mark which has not
been used is not a trademark and cannot therefore under any cir-
cumstances qualify for registration applies only to domestic individu-
als and corporations.
The administrative decision which held in favor of Langis Foods,
Ltd. means that the use requirement cannot be imposed upon foreign
trademark filings in the United States. This is illogical, as no other
signatory's tribunals have interpreted the P.U.T. as barring the use
requirement. The Board's assertion that it would do "violence to the
intent" 27 of the treaty to "require use prior to the filing of an
application" 28 is erroneous. The fact is that the issue of use or non-use
is crucial in determining whether foreign applications receive valid
registrations in at least fifteen common law signatories to the P.U.T. 2 9
In addition, some civil law countries - Austria, Brazil, Germany,
Switzerland - have a trademark law based upon the principle of use
24 539 F.2d at 201 n. 12.
25 Offner, supra note 1.
26 Id. at 106.
27 177 U.S.P.Q. at 718.
28 Id.
29 Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Ceylon, Ireland, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Rhodesia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and the United Kingdom.
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and require foreign (and domestic) applicants to allege use or intention
to use at the time of filing. In none of these signatory countries has it
ever been held that such a use requirement does "violence to the
intent" of the P.U.T. 30
The administrative decision is contrary to public policy in giving
foreign applicants a great advantage over domestic applications, since
the former are exempted from alleging use whereas the latter are still
bound by it. In today's economy, there "is hardly any sizable business
in the country that can really honestly get a trademark into commercial
use in the time before it seeks a registration,"' 31 and the Lemon Tree
ruling will make the burden upon domestics of alleging use even more
onerous. Commentators have suggested that domestic corporations
will be encouraged to file for trademark registration through their
foreign subsidiaries. The decision will also create new problems in the
Patent Office; because marks can now be derived by the act of
registration as well as from the act of use, the Unied States will have a
dual system of trademark rights unknown elsewhere in the world. 32
Though of lesser magnitude, the judicial decision of Lemon Tree is
also important. Hereafter, a trademark application filed by a foreigner
within the six month right of priority time limit will have the same
effect as if it had been filed in the United States on the same day. A
foreign applicant who has used the trademark in its country of origin
after the foreign filing, but before the actual United States filing will
obtain a constructive use date as of the date of the foreign filing. Prior
intervening use by a third party neither gives rights to that party nor
invalidates the foreign corporation's right of priority.
Hence congressional intent has been furthered by the judicial
opinion. The United States recognized thirty years ago that legal
protection of industrial property rights was very limited under interna-
tional law, 3 3 and it sought to redress this inadequacy through the
Lanham Act. Congress itself asserted that the bill was to:
carry out by statute our international commitments to the end that
American traders in foreign countries may secure the protection to
their marks to which they are entitled. 34
The Janus nature of SCM Corporation v. Langis Foods, Ltd.
exemplifies both sound and unsound legal reasoning. The judicial
30 Only recently, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, In re Farbenfabriken Bayer
AG rejected the precise Lemon Tree argument which was accepted by the Trademark
Trial and Appeals Board when it approved of the Fromagerie Bel case. That Swiss court
held that the P.U.T. does not prevent a signatory requiring use of trademark prior to
filing of application. Offner, supra note 1, at 116.
31 DeSimone, International Trademark Protection, 15 IDEA: PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J.
RESEARCH EDUC. 1 at 102 (1971).
32 Offner, supra note 1, at 119.
33 S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 346 (1930).
34 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1946).
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decision was logical and appropriate - an act of "international good
faith" 35 which encourages other participating members of the Paris
Union Convention to similarly reciprocate. 36 The holding of the
administrative agency was the worst possible - illogically conceived
and contrary to public policy. American industry has much to lose
from a short-sighted decision which requires domestics to produce and
market the item to be trademarked, and yet relieves foreigners from
this substantial requirement. In the interests of the American
economy, the Patent Office should revert to its previous policy.
FREDERIC L. BORCH, III
35 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. at 320.
36 A good example is Standard Oil of New Jersey. When it chose to alter its
corporate trademark from Esso to Exxon in 1972, it depended upon the participating
members of the Paris Union Convention to uphold this registration change. See NEW
YORKER, March 10, 1973, at 106.
